/203 cont./

291 Fig. 11) for the Surará and Pakidai (cf. Koch-Grünberg, 1923,
301 Pl. 45). As adornment the girls sometimes wear cords on their
237 arms and legs or bands across their chests. White and multi-
colored feathers are frequently tied to these cords or bands by the
531 women as much as by the men. The women paint various
382 geometric figures on their bodies, and we observed a typical de-
[386] sign in zigzag form which the women wore on their cheeks. The
pigment was red (made from onoto) or blue, made from a fruit
which the Sanemá call taarimóg, with which the women paint
one another's cheeks. The design is the same as the one which
they on occasion paint on the stones which surround the camp
and which was identified with the path of the sun and of the
moon. They say that the sun is happy /204/ to see these designs.
A very similar design which we saw on the face of a woman was
interpreted for us as "path of the moon." We were not able to
verify with any certainty whether some relationship between
menstruation and this design exists for them.

721 Before entering upon belligerent relations with an enemy,
302 the warriors paint their bodies with onoto. They believe that
[789] this practice assures good aim and protects them from the arrows
[624] of the enemy. As we have mentioned before, in time of war the
Sanemá take orders from a war chief who is different from the
one who is in command in time of peace.

727 A warrior who kills an enemy returns very slowly to his
774 home, because the "dead person weighs heavily on his chest."
They believe that the híkula of the dead person is inside the
chest of the victor. In there he tries to persuade the man to
[785] "eat a lot." But the warrior resists this and fasts for several weeks,
for otherwise the híkula of the dead person would kill him too.
After this time has passed the híkula of the enemy goes out to his
● 725 fate. It would seem that the most effective war tactic is to sur-
prise the enemy at dawn when he is asleep. We did not see
Sanemá rancherías fortified with palisades, as we did in other
Yanoama subtribes.

224 The Sanemá, like the Yanoama in general, are excellent
hunters, and many traits of their culture indicate a deep tradition
in this lore.

701 703 721 123 114 pills before the raiding party left, but I forgot them. This almost ended the raiding party, as the younger men jumped on this as an excuse to stay home. The older men, however, forced them into line and severly chastized them for being cowardly.

701 721 725 Raiding tactics also require that approximately ten men be included in the raiding party. The raiding party usually splits into two or more groups when it approaches the village of the enemy. This increases the probability that the raid will be successful; two groups are more likely to confront individuals of the enemy village while at the same time splitting up reduces the possibility that the raiders will be accidentally discovered by the enemy. After the raiders shoot one or more of the enemy, they retreat in a standardized pattern. Groups of two men retreat a specified distance, their retreat being covered by two men who lie in ambush along the trail most likely to be taken by pursuers. The guarding pair then retreats, being covered by the first pair who lie in ambush. If the raiding party has separated into two groups, retreat tactics will necessitate at least 8 men.

721 727 The purpose of a raid is to kill one or more of the enemy and retreat before being discovered. A raid is successful only if one or more of the enemy is killed and none of the raiders is wounded or killed. When a joint raiding party from Mahekodo-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi raided Riakowë's village in the early '50s to revenge the deaths of two

721 727 Mahekodo-tedi men and the victims of the 1950-51 treacherous feast, they succeeded in destroying Riakowë's village and garden, recapturing two of the women abducted by the Shamatari, killing three men, and abducting Riakowë's son.[1] They did not consider the raid a success because the Shamatari succeeded in killing one of the raiders. Again, in 1965 a joint raiding party comprised of Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi men raided the Patanowë-tedi, killing one man. One of the Monou-tedi, Konoreiwë, was badly wounded by the Patanowë-tedi and almost died. The raid was only partially successful according to the raiders.

701 • 725 721 *[628] The tactic of ambush and retreat does not require the participation of large numbers of men. Raiding parties of 60 men, therefore, are somewhat less effective than raiding parties of 25-30 men, because raiding parties of this size usually involve the cooperation of two or more villages. 701 *628 721 Then, the organization of such large numbers of men is a problem, as each village will have its own leader, and therefore the contingency of raiders provided by allied villages in a joint raid has its own leadership. Thus, joint raids are invariably less effective because of the numbers of men involved and the difficulty of organizing them properly. The contingency of allies in a joint raiding party is less enthusiastic about the raid than the group from the aggrieved village, and if the enemy is not to be found at the site being

[115] [1]Both Barker and my informants gave me an account of this raid. The two versions were identical.